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Abstract
Two new properties of a finite strategic game, strong and weak BR-dominance solv-
ability, are introduced. The first property holds, e.g., if the game is strongly dominance
solvable or if it is weakly dominance solvable and all best responses are unique. It ensures
that every simultaneous best response adjustment path, as well as every non-discriminatory
individual best response improvement path, reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number
of steps. The second property holds, e.g., if the game is weakly dominance solvable; it
ensures that every strategy profile can be connected to a Nash equilibrium with a simulta-
neous best response path and with an individual best response path (if there are more than
two players, switches from one best response to another may be needed). In a two person
game, weak BR-dominance solvability is necessary for the acyclicity of simultaneous best
response adjustment paths; if the set of Nash equilibria is rectangular, it is also necessary
for the acyclicity of best response improvement paths.
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1 Introduction
The two strands of game theory referred to in the title have two things in common. First, some
dynamic notions are involved in both cases. Second, both can be developed in a purely ordinal
framework although are equally applicable to mixed extensions. They radically differ in their
assumptions about the rationality of the players.
Dominance solvability presupposes a high degree of sophistication. Each player is able to
analyze the whole game and anticipate the results of similar analyses by the others. The term
is due to Moulin (1979) although the origins of the notion itself can be traced back to Luce
and Raiffa (1957). Actually, there are two versions of the property, strong and weak ones. The
elimination of strongly dominated strategies does not change, say, the set of Nash equilibria.
The elimination of weakly dominated strategies is not at all innocuous (Samuelson, 1992), but,
nonetheless, is often regarded as legitimate.
Individual myopic adaptation, on the contrary, is natural when the players’ rationality is
bounded and they have to rely on “local” considerations. The study of best response dynamics
by A.-A. Cournot predated the very term “game theory” by about a century. Similar processes
in various contexts were investigated by Topkis (1979), Bernheim (1984), Vives (1990), Milgrom
and Roberts (1990).
In the light of this difference, even opposition, it is very interesting to know whether a
game nice from one viewpoint may be nasty from the other. This question was addressed
by Moulin (1984), who found that dominance solvability usually implies the convergence of
Cournot tatonnement; in a rather special case, an equivalence was established. Dominance was
weak although the assumption of unique best responses made it “not so weak.” Two scenarios
of tatonnement were considered: simultaneous and sequential (with a fixed order of the players).
In a sense, this paper returns to the same subject with a newer toolbox. Although none of
the results is strikingly dissimilar to those of Moulin (1984), a much more detailed picture of
“what depends on what” is obtained. For technical convenience, we only consider finite games,
where we can essentially restrict ourselves to finite improvement (or adjustment) paths; in a
continuous game, this would be insufficient. Similarly, in a finite game dominated strategies
can be eliminated one at a time, which gives considerable technical freedom; in a continuous
game, we have to delete strategies en mass, and even then cannot expect a finite number of
eliminations to be sufficient. Iterative elimination of dominated strategies in infinite games raises
quite a few complicated questions (Gilboa et al., 1990; Marx and Swinkels, 1997; Dufwenberg
and Stegeman, 2002).
Concerning adaptive dynamics, we consider both (best response) improvements as defined
by Monderer and Shapley (1996) and Milchtaich (1996), and simultaneous best response adjust-
ments. The former include sequential tatonnement of Moulin (1984). In a broader approach to
learning in strategic games (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998), more sophisticated scenarios of adap-
tation or evolution are often considered, which involve random moves and conscious use of mixed
strategies. We work in a purely ordinal framework; however, the basic properties of improve-
ment paths to be studied here are relevant to the convergence of more complicated processes
(Kalai and Schmeidler, 1977; Young, 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995; Milchtaich, 1996; Friedman
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and Mezzetti, 2001). The language of binary relations, suggested in Kukushkin (1999), proves
useful.
Since dominance solvability seems to have no implications for better reply dynamics anyway,
we introduce an apparently new notion of BR-dominance solvability. A strategy is called strongly
BR-dominated if it is not among the best responses to any profile of strategies of the partners.
A strategy is weakly BR-dominated if it is not indispensable for providing the best responses to
all profiles of strategies of the partners; to be more precise, we consider three different versions
of the property.
A game is called strongly (weakly) BR-dominance solvable if iterative elimination of strongly
(weakly) BR-dominated strategies produces a game where all strategy profiles are Nash equilib-
ria. Clearly, a strongly (weakly) dominance solvable game is strongly (weakly) BR-dominance
solvable; both converse statements are wrong.
The iterative elimination of strongly BR-dominated strategies can be viewed as an ordinal
analogue of the rationalizability concept (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984). Admittedly, there is
a serious difference between the two situations: If a pure strategy is not a best response to
any probability distribution on the strategies of the partners, then it is dominated by a mixed
strategy, hence the latter provides a justification for the elimination of the former. When only
pure strategies are allowed, the fact that a strategy is not a best response to any profile of
strategies of the partners does not make it inferior to any other strategy.
An ordinal version of rationalizability was developed by Borges (1993), but its departure
from conventional notions of dominance was less radical than here. Actually, the question of
which strategies are not needed by a player can only be resolved with a particular scenario (or a
list of scenarios) in view; e.g., the Stackelberg solution of a two person game may well include the
choice of a strongly dominated strategy by the leader. And it is easy to see that the elimination
of strongly BR-dominated strategies does not change the set of Nash equilibria.
A very interesting feature of Moulin (1984) is an equivalence result (Corollary of Lemmas 1
and 2), even though obtained in a rather special case. From our current viewpoint, that result is
just a fortunate coincidence: when all best responses are unique, our four levels of BR-dominance
solvability become equivalent. Generally, strong BR-dominance solvability is sufficient for nice
best response dynamics, whereas weak BR-dominance solvability is necessary when there are
two players. The latter is only sufficient for the possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium from
every strategy profile with a tatonnement path. There seems to be no necessity result for more
than two players.
Section 2 contains the basic definitions and facts about improvement dynamics in strategic
games; a new version of the acyclicity of improvements in a strategic game is introduced, “finite
inclusive best response improvement property.” In Section 3, standard notions of (strong and
weak) dominance solvability are reproduced, and their “best response” modifications are de-
fined; the section also contains auxiliary results about the new concepts. Implications of strong
BR-dominance solvability, Theorems 4.4–4.6, are given in Section 4: every simultaneous best re-
sponse adjustment path reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps; every individual
best response improvement path does the same unless a player is never given an opportunity to
adapt. Weak BR-dominance solvability also has some “positive” implications, especially in the
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case of two players; they are in Section 5. Theorems 6.2, 6.4 and 6.5 about the necessity of weak
BR-dominance solvability are in Section 6; a plausible Hypothesis 6.6 remains unproven. The
last Section 7 consists of examples showing the impossibility of easy extensions of the results.
2 Improvement paths in strategic games
Our basic model is a strategic game with ordinal preferences. It is defined by a finite set of
players N , and strategy sets Xi and preference relations on XN =
∏
i∈N Xi for all i ∈ N . We
always assume that each Xi is finite and preferences are described with ordinal utility functions
ui : XN → R. For notational simplicity, we assume Xi ∩ Xj = ∅ whenever i 6= j, and denote
X = ⋃i∈N Xi. For each i ∈ N , we denote X−i =∏j∈N\{i}Xj and
Ri(x−i) = Argmax
xi∈Xi
ui(xi, x−i)
for every x−i ∈ X−i (the best response correspondence); if #N = 2, then −i refers to the partner
of player i.
We introduce the individual improvement relation BInd and best response improvement rela-
tion BBR on XN (i ∈ N , yN , xN ∈ XN):
yN BIndi xN ­ [y−i = x−i & ui(yN) > ui(xN)],
yN BInd xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN BIndi xN ];
yN BBRi xN ­ [y−i = x−i & xi /∈ Ri(x−i) 3 yi],
yN BBR xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN BBRi xN ].
By definition, a strategy profile xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium if and only if xN is a maximizer
of BInd, i.e., if yN BInd xN is impossible for any yN ∈ XN . In a finite game, xN ∈ XN is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if xN is a maximizer of BBR.
A (best response) improvement path is a finite or infinite sequence {xkN}k=0,1,... such that
xk+1N BInd xkN (xk+1N BBR xkN) whenever k ≥ 0 and xk+1N is defined; henceforth, we call such k
admissible (for a given path).
As in Kukushkin et al. (2005), we combine the terminology of Monderer and Shapley (1996),
Milchtaich (1996), and Friedman and Mezzetti (2001). A game has the finite improvement
property (FIP) if it admits no infinite improvement path. A game has the finite best response
improvement property (FBRP) if it admits no infinite best response improvement path. FIP
(FBRP) means that every (best response) improvement path reaches a Nash equilibrium in a
finite number of steps. A game has the weak FIP (weak FBRP) if, for every xN ∈ XN , there
exists a finite (best response) improvement path {x0N , . . . , xmN} such that x0N = xN and xmN is a
Nash equilibrium. Clearly, FIP ⇒ FBRP ⇒ weak FBRP ⇒ weak FIP.
A Cournot potential is a strict order (irreflexive and transitive binary relation) Â on XN
such that yN Â xN whenever yN BBR xN ; a weak Cournot potential is a strict order Â on XN
such that, whenever xN is not a Nash equilibrium, there is yN ∈ XN such that yN BBR xN
and yN Â xN . By Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 from Kukushkin (2004), a finite game has the
4
(weak) FBRP if and only if it admits a (weak) Cournot potential. Henceforth, best response
improvement paths will be called just Cournot paths ; clearly, the FBRP is equivalent to the
absence of Cournot cycles, i.e., Cournot paths x0N , x
1
N , . . . , x
m
N such that m > 0 and x
0
N = x
m
N .
A property intermediate between the FBRP and weak FBRP deserves attention. We say
that a player i ∈ N is involved in a Cournot path {xkN}k=0,1,... if for each admissible m ∈ N
there is an admissible k ≥ m such that xki ∈ Ri(xk−i). A Cournot path is inclusive if each player
i ∈ N is involved in it; a Cournot cycle is complete if for each player i ∈ N there is k ≤ m such
that xki ∈ Ri(xk−i).
A game has the finite inclusive best response improvement property (FIBRP) if it admits no
infinite inclusive Cournot path. It is immediately clear that the FIBRP implies, in particular,
the convergence of the sequential tatonnement process as defined by Moulin (1984, p. 87) in a
finite number of steps.
A preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation; with every preorder º, a strict order
Â and an equivalence relation ∼ are naturally associated. A Cournot quasipotential is a preorder
º on XN such that for every xN ∈ XN there exists a subset M(xN) ⊆ N satisfying
yN BBR xN ⇒
[
yN Â xN or [yN ∼ xN &M(yN) =M(xN) 6= ∅]
]
; (1a)
i ∈M(xN)⇒ xi /∈ Ri(x−i). (1b)
It immediately follows that yN Â xN whenever yN BBRi xN and i ∈ M(xN). If Â is a Cournot
potential, then its reflexive closure º is a Cournot quasipotential with M(xN) = ∅ for all
xN ∈ XN . If º is a Cournot quasipotential, then its asymmetric component Â is a weak
Cournot potential.
Proposition 2.1. For every finite strategic game Γ, the following statements are equivalent:
1. Γ has the FIBRP;
2. Γ admits no complete Cournot cycle;
3. Γ admits a Cournot quasipotential.
Proof. Infinite repetition of a complete Cournot cycle generates an infinite inclusive Cournot
path, hence Statement 1 implies Statement 2.
Let Statement 2 hold. To verify Statement 3, we denote º the reflexive and transitive closure
of BBR: yN º xN if and only if there is a finite Cournot path x0N , x1N , . . . , xmN such that x0N = xN
and xmN = yN (m ≥ 0). Let Y ⊆ XN be an equivalence class of ∼ with #Y > 1; we denote
D(Y ) = {i ∈ N | ∀xN ∈ Y [xi /∈ Ri(x−i)]}. Since all xN ∈ Y can be arranged into a single
Cournot cycle and that cycle cannot be complete, D(Y ) 6= ∅. Now we define M(xN) = D(Y ) if
xN belongs to a non-singleton equivalence class Y , and M(xN) = ∅ otherwise. The conditions
(1) are checked easily.
Finally, let º be a Cournot quasipotential and {xkN}k=0,1,... be an infinite Cournot path; we
have to show that a player i ∈ N is not involved in the path. Since XN is finite, at least one
strategy profile x¯N must enter into the path an infinite number of times. Let x
m
N = x¯N for the
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first time; clearly, we must have xk+1N ∼ xkN for all k ≥ m. By (1a),M(xk+1N ) =M(xkN) =M0 6= ∅
for all k ≥ m. By (1b), we have xki /∈ Ri(xk−i) for all i ∈ M0 and k ≥ m. Thus, each player
i ∈M0 is not involved.
Corollary. If a finite two person game Γ has the FIBRP, then it has the FBRP.
Proof. By Proposition 2.1, Γ admits no complete Cournot cycle; on the other hand, best response
improvements by one player cannot form a cycle in any game.
Remark. In the proof of Theorem 3 of Kukushkin (2004), the FBRP was derived from the
presence of a “quasipotential” in an even weaker sense than (1). The point is that whenever a
game satisfies the conditions of that theorem, so do all its reduced games. Generally, we only
obtain FIBRP. In particular, dominance solvability (in any sense) need not be inherited by the
reduced games, hence Theorem 4.4 below also asserts only FIBRP.
We introduce the simultaneous best response adjustment relationB∗BR onXN (yN , xN ∈ XN):
yN B∗BR xN ­
[∀i ∈ N [yi = xi ∈ Ri(x−i) or xi /∈ Ri(x−i) 3 yi] & yN 6= xN ].
In a finite game, xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium if and only if xN is a maximizer of B∗BR. A
simultaneous Cournot path is a finite or infinite sequence {xkN}k=0,1,... such that xk+1N B∗BR xkN
whenever k ≥ 0 and xk+1N is defined.
Remark. We do not use the term “improvement” here because yN B∗BR xN is compatible with
ui(yN) < ui(xN) for all i ∈ N .
A game has the finite simultaneous best response adjustment property (FSP) if there exists
no infinite simultaneous Cournot path. FSP implies that every simultaneous Cournot path
eventually leads to a Nash equilibrium. A game has the weak FSP if, for every xN ∈ XN , there
exists a finite simultaneous Cournot path {x0N , . . . , xmN} such that x0N = xN and xmN is a Nash
equilibrium.
A simultaneous Cournot potential is a strict order Â on XN such that yN Â xN whenever
yN B∗BR xN ; a weak simultaneous Cournot potential is a strict order Â on XN such that,
whenever xN is not a Nash equilibrium, there is yN ∈ XN such that yN B∗BR xN and yN Â xN .
By Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 from Kukushkin (2004), a finite game has the (weak) FSP if and
only if it admits a (weak) simultaneous Cournot potential.
Proposition 2.2. If a finite two person game Γ has the (weak) FSP, then it has the (weak)
FBRP.
Proof. For every xN ∈ XN , we define
ν(xN) = #{i ∈ N | xi ∈ Ri(x−i)}. (2)
If ν(xN) = 2, then xN is a Nash equilibrium. If yN BBR xN , then ν(yN) ≥ 1. If x0N , . . . , xmN = x0N
(m > 0) is a Cournot cycle, then ν(xkN) = 1 for all k. If ν(xN) = 1, then yN B∗BR xN is
6
equivalent to yN BBR xN . Therefore, every Cournot cycle is a simultaneous Cournot cycle,
hence FSP implies FBRP.
Let Γ have the weak FSP and x0N ∈ XN ; then there is a simultaneous Cournot path
x0N , . . . , x
m
N such that x
m
N is a Nash equilibrium. If ν(x
0
N) = 1, then ν(x
k
N) = 1 as well for
all k < m, hence the path is also a Cournot path. Let ν(x0N) = 0 and ν(x
k
N) ≥ 1 for the first
time when k = k¯ (0 < k¯ ≤ m). Without restricting generality, we may assume xk¯1 ∈ R1(xk¯2).
We denote yk¯+1N = x
k¯
N , y
0
N = x
0
N , y
k¯−2h
N = (x
k¯−2h
1 , x
k¯−2h−1
2 ) (h = 0, 1, . . . , 2h + 1 ≤ k¯), and
yk¯−2h−1N = (x
k¯−2h−2
1 , x
k¯−2h−1
2 ) (h = 0, 1, . . . , 2h+ 1 < k¯). It is immediately clear from the defini-
tions that yk¯−2h1 ∈ R1(yk¯−2h−12 ), yk¯−2h2 = yk¯−2h−12 , yk¯−2h−12 ∈ R2(yk¯−2h−21 ), and yk¯−2h−11 = yk¯−2h−21
for all admissible h. (If k¯ is odd, then player 1 moves from x0N = y
0
N to y
1
N ; if k¯ is even, it is
player 2.) For every k = 0, 1, . . . , k¯, either yk+1N BBR ykN or ykN is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
we have obtained a Cournot path starting at x0N = y
0
N and ending either at a Nash equilibrium
or at xk¯N with ν(x
k¯
N) = 1. In the first case, we are home immediately; in the second, we recall
that xk¯N , . . . , x
m
N is a Cournot path.
When there are more than two players, there seems to be no relation between the convergence
of Cournot paths and simultaneous Cournot paths (see Moulin, 1986).
Proposition 2.3. For every finite two person game Γ where Ri(x−i) is a singleton for every
i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, the weak FSP (FBRP) implies the FSP (FBRP).
Proof. No more than one simultaneous Cournot path can be started from any xN . Therefore,
if there were a simultaneous Cournot cycle, no equilibrium could be reached from any strategy
profile belonging to the cycle. Similarly, no more than one Cournot path can be started from
xN such that xi ∈ Ri(x−i) for at least one i ∈ N , and every Cournot cycle must consist of such
profiles.
3 Elimination of dominated strategies
Let Γ be a strategic game, i ∈ N , and xi, yi ∈ Xi. We call yi and xi equivalent, yi ≈ xi, if
ui(yi, x−i) = ui(xi, x−i) for all x−i ∈ X−i. We say that yi strongly dominates xi, yi ≫ xi, if
for every x−i ∈ X−i, there holds ui(yi, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i). We say that yi weakly dominates xi,
yi À xi, if ui(yi, x−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i) for every x−i ∈ X−i, while ui(yi, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i) for some
x−i ∈ X−i. A strategy yi ∈ Xi is strongly (weakly) dominant if yi ≫ xi (yi À xi) for any
xi 6= yi. A strategy xi ∈ Xi is strongly (weakly) dominated if there exists yi ∈ Xi such that
yi ≫ xi (yi À xi).
A fragment Γ′ of Γ is a strategic game with the same set of players N , nonempty subsets
∅ 6= X ′i ⊆ Xi for all i ∈ N , and the restrictions of the same utility functions to X ′N =
∏
i∈N X
′
i.
Let X ′i contain both yi and xi. Then the relations yi ≈ xi or yi ≫ xi in Γ imply the same
relations in Γ′; if yi À xi in Γ, then either yi ≈ xi or yi À xi in Γ′.
Given a strategic game Γ, an elimination scheme of the length m > 0 is a mapping
ξ : {1, . . . ,m} → X ; we associate with the scheme a sequence of fragments Γk of Γ: Γ0 = Γ;
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Xki = Xi \ ξ({1, . . . , k}) for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and i ∈ N . It is convenient to allow an elimi-
nation scheme of the length 0, which means just taking Γ0 = Γ. An elimination scheme of the
length m ≥ 0 is perfect if yi ≈ xi in Γm for every i ∈ N and yi, xi ∈ Xmi (hence every xN ∈ XmN
is a Nash equilibrium in Γm).
A game Γ is strongly dominance solvable if it admits a perfect elimination scheme such that,
for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the deleted strategy ξ(k) is strongly dominated in Γk−1. A game
Γ is weakly dominance solvable if it admits a perfect elimination scheme such that, for each
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there is κ(k) < k such that the deleted strategy ξ(k) is weakly dominated in
Γκ(k).
Remark. When strongly dominated strategies are iteratively deleted, the result does not depend
on the details of the process. The latter may very much matter in the case of the elimination of
weakly dominated strategies; the presence of κ(k) in our definition allows for both simultaneous
and sequential elimination. The more usual requirement is that each player should become
indifferent between all outcomes when the elimination process is completed; our perfect schemes
do not ensure that. However, our weaker condition is sufficient for all “nice” conclusions.
With a slight abuse, we denote R−1i (xi) = {x−i ∈ X−i | xi ∈ Ri(x−i)}. A strategy xi ∈ Xi is
strongly BR-dominated if R−1i (xi) = ∅. Let xi, yi ∈ Xi; we say that yi weakly (“not so weakly”)
BR-dominates xi, denoting the fact yi ºº xi (yi ÂÂ xi), if yi 6= xi and R−1i (xi) ⊆ R−1i (yi)
(R−1i (xi) ⊂ R−1i (yi)); note that ÂÂ is the asymmetric component of ºº. It is immediately
clear that a strongly (weakly) dominated strategy is strongly (weakly) BR-dominated, while a
strongly BR-dominated strategy is weakly BR-dominated by any other, and “not so weakly”
BR-dominated by any strategy which is not strongly BR-dominated itself. A strategy xi ∈
Xi is very weakly BR-dominated if Ri(x−i) \ {xi} 6= ∅ for every x−i ∈ X−i. Every weakly
BR-dominated strategy is very weakly BR-dominated.
An S-scheme (W+-scheme, W-scheme, W−-scheme) is an elimination scheme ξ of the length
m such that, for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the deleted strategy ξ(k) is strongly (“not so weakly”,
weakly, or very weakly) BR-dominated in Γk−1. We call Γ strongly (weakly, etc.) BR-dominance
solvable if it admits a perfect S-scheme (W-scheme, etc.). Since equivalent strategies weakly
BR-dominate each other, the elimination of (very) weakly BR-dominated strategies can be
continued until each Xmi is a singleton; however, it is technically more convenient to have all
definitions as similar to one another as possible.
Since BR-dominance solvability seems to have never been studied in the literature, we provide
detailed proofs of familiar results in the new context. Four implications are obvious: a strongly
dominance solvable game is strongly BR-dominance solvable with the same elimination scheme;
a strongly BR-dominance solvable game is “not so weakly” BR-dominance solvable with the
same elimination scheme; and similarly for (“not so”) weak BR-dominance solvability.
Proposition 3.1. If Γ is weakly dominance solvable, then Γ is weakly BR-dominance solvable
with the same elimination scheme.
Proof. At every step k, the deleted strategy ξ(k) ∈ Xk−1i is weakly dominated in Γκ(k): yi À ξ(k)
with yi ∈ Xκ(k)i . The strategy yi need not belong to Xk−1i , but the transitivity of À implies
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that there is k′ < k and y′i ∈ Xk−1i such that y′i À ξ(k) in Γk′ . Clearly, y′i 6= ξ(k) and either
y′i À ξ(k) or y′i ≈ ξ(k) in Γk−1; therefore, y′i ºº ξ(k) in Γk−1, i.e., ξ(k) is weakly BR-dominated
in Γk−1.
Proposition 3.2. If xN is a Nash equilibrium in Γ and ξ is an S-scheme of the length m, then
xN ∈ XmN .
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let k be the first step when xN /∈ XkN ; then xi = ξ(k) and
x−i ∈ Xk−1−i for some i ∈ N . On the other hand, xi ∈ Ri(x−i) in Γ, hence it cannot be
BR-dominated in Γk−1: a contradiction.
Lemma 3.3. Let ξ be a W−-scheme of the length m; then Ri(x−i) ∩Xki 6= ∅ whenever i ∈ N ,
k ≤ m, and x−i ∈ Xk−i.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let h ≥ 0 be the first step when Ri(x−i) ∩ Xh+1i = ∅. Then
ξ(h + 1) ∈ Ri(x−i), hence Ri(x−i) = Rhi (x−i). By definition, there is yi ∈ Rhi (x−i) such that
yi 6= xi. Clearly, yi ∈ Ri(x−i) ∩Xh+1i , which contradicts the definition of h.
Proposition 3.4. If Γ is very weakly BR-dominance solvable and xN ∈ XmN , then xN is a Nash
equilibrium in Γ.
Proof. For each i ∈ N , we apply Lemma 3.3 to x−i ∈ Xm−i and pick yi ∈ Ri(x−i) ∩ Xmi . By
definition, yi ≈ xi in Γm, hence xi ∈ Ri(x−i) as well.
Propositions 3.2 and 3.4 immediately imply that the set of Nash equilibria in a strongly
BR-dominance solvable game is rectangular, and all perfect S-schemes eliminate the strategies
not participating in the equilibria.
4 Strong BR-dominance solvability
First, we show that weak and strong BR-dominance solvability are equivalent under the unique-
ness of best responses as assumed in Moulin (1984).
Lemma 4.1. If Ri(x−i) is a singleton for every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, then every W−-scheme
is an S-scheme.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, we must have a stage k (1 ≤ k ≤ m) when the deleted, very
weakly BR-dominated strategy ξ(k) ∈ Xi is not strongly BR-dominated in Γk−1, i.e., is a best
response to x−i ∈ Xk−1−i . Let Ri(x−i) = {yi}; applying Lemma 3.3, we obtain yi ∈ Xk−1i , hence
Rk−1i (x−i) = Ri(x−i) = {yi}. Therefore, ξ(k) = yi, while Rk−1i (x−i)\{yi} = ∅, i.e., yi is not very
weakly BR-dominated in Γk−1.
Proposition 4.2. If Γ is very weakly BR-dominance solvable and Ri(x−i) is a singleton for
every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, then Γ is strongly BR-dominance solvable.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Lemma 4.1.
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Let us introduce some useful notations and an auxiliary result. Given an elimination scheme
ξ of the length m, we define µ : X → {1, . . . ,m+ 1} by
µ(ξ(k)) = k; (3a)
µ(xi) = m+ 1 if xi /∈ ξ({1, . . . ,m}). (3b)
We also define µ− : XN → {1, . . . ,m+ 1} by
µ−(xN) = min
i∈N
µ(xi). (3c)
As long as µ(xi) ≤ m, µ is injective, hence Argmini∈N µ(xi) is a singleton whenever µ−(xN) ≤ m.
Lemma 4.3. Let ξ be an S-scheme of the length m and xN ∈ XN be such that µ−(xN) ≤ m;
then for every i ∈ N and yi ∈ Ri(x−i), there holds µ(yi) > µ−(xN).
Proof. If µ(yi) = k ≤ µ−(xN) ≤ m, then yi is strongly BR-dominated in Γk−1; since x−i ∈
X
µ−(xN )−1
−i ⊆ Xk−1−i , this is incompatible with yi ∈ Ri(x−i).
Theorem 4.4. If a finite game Γ is strongly BR-dominance solvable, then it has the FIBRP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect S-scheme ξ, we consider the functions µ and µ− defined by (3). Let us
show that the preorder represented by µ−, i.e., yN º xN ­ µ−(yN) ≥ µ−(xN), is a Cournot
quasipotential with M(xN) = Argmini∈N µ(xi) when µ
−(xN) ≤ m and M(xN) = ∅ otherwise.
If µ−(xN) = m+ 1, then xN ∈ XmN , hence xN is a Nash equilibrium in Γ by Proposition 3.4.
Let yN BBRi xN ; then µ−(xN) ≤ m, hence Lemma 4.3 is applicable. If i /∈ M(xN), then
µ−(yN) = µ−(xN) and M(yN) = M(xN); if i ∈ M(xN), then µ−(yN) > µ−(xN) because
M(xN) = {i}. We see that condition (1a) holds. Finally, if i ∈M(xN), then µ(xi) = µ−(xN) ≤
m; if xi ∈ Ri(x−i), then Lemma 4.3 would imply µ(xi) > µ(xi). Thus, (1b) holds as well.
Theorem 4.5. If a finite two person game Γ is strongly BR-dominance solvable, then it has the
FBRP.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Theorem 4.4 and Corollary to Proposition 2.1.
The FBRP in the formulation of Theorem 4.5 cannot be replaced with the FIP: if one player
has a strongly dominant strategy x+i , then any behavior of improvement paths with x
k
i 6= x+i
is compatible with strong dominance solvability. For the same reason, the FIBRP cannot be
replaced with the FBRP in Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.6. If a finite game Γ is strongly BR-dominance solvable, then it has the FSP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect S-scheme ξ, we consider the functions µ and µ− defined by (3). Let
us show that the strict order represented by µ−, i.e., yN Â xN ­ µ−(yN) > µ−(xN), is a
simultaneous Cournot potential. Let yN B∗BR xN ; then µ−(xN) ≤ m. By Lemma 4.3, µ(yi) >
µ−(xN) for every i ∈ N , hence µ−(yN) > µ−(xN) as well.
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5 Weak BR-dominance solvability
Lemma 5.1. Let ξ be a W−-scheme of the length m and xN ∈ XN be such that µ−(xN) ≤ m;
then for each i ∈ N there is yi ∈ Ri(x−i) such that µ(yi) > µ−(xN).
Proof. Let µ−(xN) = k; for each i ∈ N , we pick yi maximizing µ over Ri(x−i). Lemma 3.3
implies µ(yi) ≥ k for each i ∈ N because x−i ∈ Xk−1−i . If µ(xi) > k, then µ(yi) > k because µ is
injective; let µ(xi) = k. If xi /∈ Ri(x−i), we have yi 6= xi, hence µ(yi) > µ(xi) = k. Otherwise,
µ(x′i) ≥ k + 1 for every x′i ∈ Rk−1i (x−i) \ {xi}, which set is not empty because xi is very weakly
dominated in Γk−1; therefore, µ(yi) ≥ µ(x′i) ≥ k + 1.
Theorem 5.2. If a finite two person game is very weakly BR-dominance solvable, then it has
the weak FSP and the weak FBRP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect W−-scheme ξ, we consider the functions µ and µ− defined by (3), and
introduce a binary relation on XN :
yN Â xN ­
[
µ−(yN) > µ−(xN) or
∃i ∈ N [µ−(xN) = µ(xi) = µ−(yN) & xi ∈ Ri(x−i) & x−i /∈ R−i(xi) 3 y−i]
]
. (4)
The relation is obviously irreflexive; the transitivity is obvious as long as the first disjunctive term
in (4) is applicable. Let yN Â xN by the second term. Since x−i /∈ R−i(xi), we have µ−(yN) ≤ m,
hence the minimizing i ∈ N is unique and xi = yi. Now if zN Â yN , then the second disjunctive
term in (4) cannot be valid because y−i ∈ R−i(yi), hence µ−(zN) > µ−(yN) = µ−(xN), hence
zN Â xN by the first term in (4). Similarly, if xN Â zN , then the second term in (4) cannot be
valid because x−i /∈ R−i(xi), hence µ−(yN) = µ−(xN) > µ−(zN), hence yN Â zN .
Let us show that Â is a weak simultaneous Cournot potential; let xN ∈ XN . For each j ∈ N ,
we define yj = xj if xj ∈ Rj(x−j), and pick yj maximizing µ over Rj(x−j) otherwise. If yN = xN ,
then xN is a Nash equilibrium already; otherwise, yN B∗BR xN . Let us show yN Â xN .
First, we note that µ−(xN) ≤ m, hence µ−(xN) = µ(xi) for a unique i. By Lemma 5.1,
µ−(yN) ≥ µ−(xN). If the inequality is strict, the first disjunctive term in (4) works. Otherwise,
we have yi = xi, hence xi ∈ Ri(x−i) by the definition of yi; besides, y−i ∈ R−i(xi) by the same
definition. Since xN is not a Nash equilibrium, x−i /∈ R−i(xi). Thus, yN Â xN by the second
disjunctive term in (4).
The weak FBRP immediately follows from the weak FSP and Proposition 2.2.
For more than two players, Theorem 5.2 is wrong as Example 7.2 shows; only a “very weak”
FSP, or a “very weak” FBRP, are then ensured. An individual best response path is a finite
or infinite sequence {xkN}k=0,1,... such that, whenever xk+1N is defined, there is i ∈ N for which
xk+1−i = x
k
−i, x
k+1
i 6= xki , and xk+1i ∈ Ri(xk−i). A simultaneous best response path is a finite or
infinite sequence {xkN}k=0,1,... such that xk+1N 6= xkN and xk+1i ∈ Ri(xk−i) for all i ∈ N whenever
xk+1N is defined.
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Theorem 5.3. If a finite game is very weakly BR-dominance solvable, then every strategy profile
can be connected to a Nash equilibrium with a simultaneous best response path, as well as with
an individual best response path.
Proof. As above, if µ−(xN) = m+1, then xN is already a Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, we pick
yi maximizing µ over Ri(x−i) for each i ∈ N ; clearly, {xN , yN} is a simultaneous best response
path. By Lemma 5.1, µ−(yN) > µ−(xN). If yN is not a Nash equilibrium, we make a similar
step, and so on. Thus we obtain a simultaneous best response path along which µ− strictly
increases until a Nash equilibrium is reached.
The second statement immediately follows from a straightforward modification of the proof
of Proposition 2.2.
6 On the necessity of BR-dominance solvability
Lemma 6.1. For every finite two person game Γ, at least one of the following statements holds:
1. Every strategy set Xi is a singleton.
2. Γ admits a simultaneous Cournot cycle.
3. There is a weakly BR-dominated strategy in Γ.
Proof. Let Statements 1 and 2 not hold. If every strategy profile xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium,
then all strategies of the same player are equivalent, hence Statement 3 holds. Otherwise, there
is, at least, one pair of strategy profiles such that yN B∗BR xN . Since there is no simultaneous
Cournot cycle, we can pick an xN ∈ XN which is not a Nash equilibrium and for which xN B∗BR
x′N is impossible for any x
′
N ∈ XN .
For each i ∈ N , we denote X ′−i = R−1i (xi) ⊆ X−i. If X ′i = ∅ for an i ∈ N , then xi is
even strongly BR-dominated and we are home. Let X ′N = X
′
1 × X ′2 6= ∅. Since xN is not a
Nash equilibrium, there must be i ∈ N and x0i ∈ X ′i such that x0i 6= xi. If R−1i (x0i ) ⊇ X ′−i,
then x0i ºº xi and we are home again; otherwise, there is x0−i ∈ X ′−i such that x0i /∈ Ri(x0−i).
Since xN B∗BR x0N is assumed impossible, we must have x−i 6= x0−i ∈ R−i(x0i ). Again, if
R−1−i (x
0
−i) ⊇ X ′i, then x0−i ºº x−i. Otherwise, there is x1i ∈ X ′i such that x0−i /∈ R−i(x1i ); we denote
x1N = (x
1
i , x
0
−i) ∈ X ′N . Since xN B∗BR x1N is assumed impossible, we must have xi 6= x1i ∈ Ri(x0−i);
therefore, x1N B∗BR x0N . Again, if R−1i (x1i ) ⊇ X ′−i, then x1i ºº xi; otherwise, there is x2−i ∈ X ′−i
such that x1i /∈ Ri(x2−i). We denote x2N = (x1i , x2−i) ∈ X ′N ; again, x2N B∗BR x1N B∗BR x0N , and so
on.
Since there is no simultaneous Cournot cycle, the simultaneous Cournot path x0N , x
1
N , . . .
cannot be infinite. On the other hand, the next profile xk+1N cannot be defined only if x
k
i ºº xi
for an i ∈ N . Thus, Statement 3 holds.
Theorem 6.2. If a finite two person game Γ has the FSP, then it is weakly BR-dominance
solvable.
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Proof. We apply Lemma 6.1. If XN is a singleton, Γ is even strong BR-dominance solvable.
Statement 2 cannot hold by the FSP assumption. Therefore, there is a weakly BR-dominated
strategy xi. The elimination of xi defines a W-scheme of the length 1 and a fragment Γ
1. By
Lemma 3.3, we have R1i (x−i) = Ri(x−i)∩X1i for all i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X1−i; therefore, the relation
B∗BR in Γ1 is the restriction of B∗BR in Γ to X1N , hence Γ1 also has the FSP, hence Lemma 6.1
applies again. The process only stops when XmN is a singleton; then the W-scheme will be perfect
(it may become so even before that).
The Battle of Sexes shows that the FSP in Theorem 6.2 cannot be replaced with the FBRP
(or even FIP). This becomes possible under an additional assumption that the set of Nash
equilibria is rectangular.
Lemma 6.3. For every finite two person game Γ, at least one of the following statements holds:
1. Every strategy profile xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium.
2. Γ admits a Cournot cycle.
3. The set of Nash equilibria in Γ is not rectangular.
4. There is a “not so weakly” BR-dominated strategy in Γ.
Proof. Let Statements 1, 2, and 3 not hold. We have to show that Statement 4 holds. If there
is a strongly BR-dominated strategy in Γ, we are home immediately; suppose there is none.
For each i ∈ N , there is X0i ⊆ Xi such that X0N = X1N ×X2N is the set of Nash equilibria of
Γ; therefore, R−1i (x
0
i ) ⊇ X0−i for both i ∈ N and all x0i ∈ X0i . We pick an xN ∈ XN \ X0N 6= ∅
and start a Cournot path from xN ; since Γ has the FBRP, the path must end at an x
0
N ∈ X0N ;
therefore, R−1i (x
0
i ) ⊃ X0−i for an i ∈ N .
We define a binary relation B on Xi:
yi B xi ­ ∃x−i ∈ X−i [xi /∈ Ri(x−i) 3 yi & x−i ∈ R−i(xi) & x−i /∈ R−i(yi)]. (5)
Let us show that B is acyclic. Supposing to the contrary that x0i , x1i , . . . , xmi = x0i are such that
xk+1i B xki for each k = 0, . . . ,m − 1, we pick, for each k, an xk−i from (5). Then we define
x2kN = (x
k
i , x
k
−i) and x
2k+1
N = (x
k+1
i , x
k
−i) for each k = 0, . . . ,m − 1. It follows immediately from
(5) that x0N , x
1
N , . . . , x
2m
N = x
0
N is a Cournot cycle in Γ, i.e., Statement 2 holds.
Since Xi is finite and B is acyclic, there is yi ∈ Xi such that yi B xi does not hold for any
xi ∈ Xi. For every x−i ∈ R−1i (yi), we consider two alternatives: If x−i ∈ R−i(yi), then (yi, x−i)
is a Nash equilibrium, hence x−i ∈ X0−i. If x−i /∈ R−i(yi), then we pick xi ∈ R−1−i (x−i) 6= ∅; then
xi ∈ Ri(x−i) because we would have yi B xi otherwise; therefore, (xi, x−i) is a Nash equilibrium,
hence x−i ∈ X0−i again. Thus, R−1i (yi) ⊆ X0−i ⊂ R−1i (x0i ), i.e., Statement 4 holds.
Theorem 6.4. If a finite two person game Γ has the FBRP and the set of Nash equilibria in Γ
is rectangular, then Γ is “not so weakly” BR-dominance solvable.
13
Proof. We apply Lemma 6.3 in the same way as Lemma 6.1 was applied in the proof of Theo-
rem 6.2.
Theorem 6.5. If a finite two person game Γ has the weak FBRP and the set of Nash equilibria
in Γ is rectangular, then Γ is very weakly BR-dominance solvable.
Proof. We assume that the set of Nash equilibria in Γ is X0N = X
0
1×X02 . For every xN ∈ XN , we
define P (xN) as the length of the shortest Cournot path connecting xN to a Nash equilibrium;
then P (xN) = 0 ⇐⇒ xN ∈ X0N . Clearly, there is a mapping pi : XN → XN such that: (i)
pi(xN) = xN ⇐⇒ xN ∈ X0N ; (ii) pi(xN) BBR xN and P (pi(xN)) = P (xN)−1 whenever xN /∈ X0N .
The iteration of pi defines a “recommended Cournot path” from an arbitrary strategy profile
xN ∈ XN to a Nash equilibrium. We denote M = maxxN∈XN P (xN).
If M ≤ 1, then X−i = X0−i for at least one i ∈ N and R−1i (xi) = ∅ for every xi ∈ Xi \X0i ,
hence Γ is even strongly BR-dominance solvable. Let P (x∗N) = M ≥ 2. Without restricting
generality, pi(x∗N) = (x
∗
1, y2), hence x
∗
2 /∈ R2(x∗1) and P (x∗1, y2) =M − 1.
Claim 6.5.1. If xN ∈ XN and pi1(xN) = x∗1, then x1 = x∗1.
Proof. Suppose the contrary: pi(xN) = (x
∗
1, x2) while x1 6= x∗1; then x∗1 ∈ R1(x2). Let pi(x∗1, x2) =
(x∗1, x
′
2), hence x
′
2 ∈ R2(x∗1), hence (x∗1, x′2) BBR x∗N . Now if P (x∗1, x′2) < M − 1, we obtain a
contradiction with P (x∗N) =M . If P (x
∗
1, x
′
2) ≥M −1, we obtain P (xN) > M , contradicting the
definition of M .
We see that the elimination of x∗1 would not destroy the weak FBRP. If x
∗
1 is very weakly
BR-dominated, we are home. Suppose the contrary: R1(x
′
2) = {x∗1} for an x′2 ∈ X2; then
x′2 /∈ X02 .
Claim 6.5.2. For any x1 ∈ X1, x′2 /∈ R2(x1).
Proof. Otherwise, we would have pi(x1, x
′
2) = (x
∗
1, x
′
2), hence x1 = x
∗
1 by Claim 6.5.1, hence
(x∗1, x
′
2) ∈ X0N .
Therefore, x′2 is even strongly BR-dominated and pi2(xN) 6= x′2 for any xN ∈ XN , hence
the elimination of x′2 will not destroy the weak FBRP. A straightforward inductive argument
completes the proof.
Hypothesis 6.6. If a finite two person game Γ has the weak FSP, then Γ is very weakly
BR-dominance solvable.
Remark. The existence of very weakly BR-dominated strategies under the conditions is easy
to show. However, the elimination of an arbitrary dominated strategy may destroy the weak
FSP, even the weak FBRP, making further recursion impossible. In the proof of Theorem 6.5,
a suitable candidate for the elimination was pointed out; here, it has not yet been found.
The relationship between BR-dominance solvability and nice best response dynamics be-
comes especially simple in the case of two person games with unique best responses, as in Moulin
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(1984). According to Proposition 2.3 and Lemma 4.1, there is then no need to distinguish be-
tween strong and weak versions of the properties. The set of Nash equilibria is rectangular if
and only if it is a singleton.
Corollary to Theorem 6.2. If Γ is a finite two person game such that Ri(x−i) is a singleton
for every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, and Γ has the weak FSP, then Γ is strongly BR-dominance
solvable.
Corollary to Theorem 6.4. If Γ is a finite two person game such that Ri(x−i) is a singleton
for every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, the set of Nash equilibria in Γ is a singleton, and Γ has the
weak FBRP, then Γ is strongly BR-dominance solvable.
7 “Counterexamples”
Example 7.1 shows that “not so weak” BR-dominance solvability could not be asserted in Propo-
sition 3.1.
Example 7.1. Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
(3, 3) (2, 2) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1)
.
The middle column weakly dominates the right one; when the latter is deleted, the upper row
becomes strongly dominant. Therefore, the game is weakly dominance solvable. On the other
hand, none of the strategies is “not so weakly” BR-dominated: each row is the unique best
response to a column; the left column is the unique best response to the upper row; both other
columns are only best responses to the bottom row.
Example 7.2 shows that Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 become wrong if Γ is only weakly domi-
nance solvable (or “not so weakly” BR-dominance solvable); Example 7.3 shows the same for
Theorem 4.5.
Example 7.2. Let us consider a three person 2 × 3 × 2 game (where player 1 chooses rows,
player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices):[
(3, 3, 3) (2, 1, 1) (1, 2, 2)
(3, 3, 3) (1, 2, 2) (2, 1, 1)
] [
(0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 1) (1, 2, 2)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 2) (2, 1, 1)
]
.
Nash equilibria fill the left column of the left matrix; however, none of the underlined strategy
profiles could be connected to any equilibrium with an individual improvement path or with
a simultaneous Cournot path. Thus, the game does not have even the weak FIP or the weak
FSP. On the other hand, it is weakly dominance solvable: The choice of the left matrix weakly
dominates the choice of the right matrix; when the latter is deleted, the left column becomes
strongly dominant.
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Example 7.3. Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
(0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1)
(0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0)
(2, 2) (1, 0) (1, 0)
.
The bottom row and the left column are weakly dominant; the southwestern corner of the matrix
is a unique Nash equilibrium. The underlined fragment is a Cournot cycle (hence a simultaneous
Cournot cycle as well).
The Battle of Sexes has the FIP, but is not even very weakly BR-dominance solvable; there-
fore, the converse to Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 would be wrong. Example 7.4 shows the impossibility
to reverse Theorem 4.5 even when the set of Nash equilibria is rectangular. Example 7.5 shows
the impossibility to reverse Theorem 4.6, or assert “not so weak” BR-dominance solvability in
Theorem 6.4.
Example 7.4. Let us consider a two person 2× 2 game:
(0, 2) (2, 0)
(1, 1) (1, 1)
.
The southwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium. The game obviously has the FIP. On
the other hand, each strategy of each player is a best response to a strategy of the partner;
therefore, the game is not strongly BR-dominance solvable.
Example 7.5. Let us consider a two person 2× 2 game:
(1, 1) (0, 1)
(0, 1) (1, 1)
.
There are two Nash equilibria: the northwestern and southeastern corners. Simultaneous best
response adjustment from any other strategy profile immediately produces a Nash equilibrium,
so the game has the FSP. On the other hand, each strategy of player 1 is the unique best response
to a strategy of the partner; each strategy of player 2 is a best response to each strategy of the
partner. Therefore, the game is not strongly BR-dominance solvable, nor even “not so weak”
BR-dominance solvable.
Example 7.6 shows that Theorem 6.2 is wrong for more than two players; Example 7.7 shows
the same for Theorem 6.4.
Example 7.6. Let us consider a three person 2 × 2 × 2 game (where player 1 chooses rows,
player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices):[
(2, 1, 2) (4, 4, 4)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 3, 3)
] [
(0, 0, 0) (3, 2, 1)
(4, 4, 4) (0, 0, 0)
]
.
The two Nash equilibria are not underlined. Each of the three strategy profiles underlined once
is dominated in the sense of B∗BR only by a Nash equilibrium; each of the three strategy profiles
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underlined twice is dominated in the same sense only by a strategy profile underlined once.
Thus, the game has the FSP. On the other hand, each strategy of each player is a unique best
response to a strategy profile of the partners. Therefore, the game is not even very weakly
BR-dominance solvable.
Example 7.7. Let us consider a three person 2 × 2 × 2 game (where player 1 chooses rows,
player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices):[
(3, 4, 3) (0, 0, 0)
(5, 5, 5) (4, 3, 4)
] [
(2, 2, 1) (1, 1, 2)
(0, 0, 0) (2, 2, 1)
]
.
The southwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium; the FBRP is easy to check. On the
other hand, each strategy of each player is the unique best response to a strategy profile of the
partners. Therefore, the game is not even very weakly BR-dominance solvable.
Example 7.8 shows that the adverb “very” cannot be dropped in Theorem 6.5 or Hypothe-
sis 6.6.
Example 7.8. Let us consider a two person 6× 6 game defined by the left matrix:
(3, 3) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2)
(0, 0) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1)
(0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2)
(1, 2) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1)

0 4 2 4 4 2
3 4 3 4 5 3
3 4 4 5 4 3
5 5 5 6 5 6
3 4 3 4 4 3
1 5 2 5 4 2
.
The northwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium. The weak FSP is easy to check: the right
matrix shows the length of the shortest simultaneous Cournot path leading to the equilibrium
from every strategy profile. By Proposition 2.2, the game has the weak FBRP as well. On
the other hand, none of the sets R−1i (xi) include each other for either i ∈ N , even if non-strict
inclusion is taken into account. Therefore, there is no weakly BR-dominated strategy.
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